



**International Journal of Economics,
Environmental Development and Society
(IJEEDS)**

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IN AFRICA: RETHINKING NIGERIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA

Amaechi EHIMATE

Department of History and International Studies
University of Delta, Agbor, Delta State, Nigeria

amaechiehimate@unidel.edu.ng

Paul Ovie ENUEME

Department of History, Strategic and International Studies
Dennis Osadebay University, Amwai, Asaba, Delta State, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

Terrorism, insurgency and armed aggression, have continued to dominate discussions in scholarly circles in recent times. Whereas the issue of terrorism is a global phenomenon, the frequency of its occurrence, coupled with its horrendous consequences in Africa is quite alarming. More worrisome is the fact that international cartels and terrorist gangs have made Africa their operational base, in such a manner that the entire continent is already engulfed in a chain of violent armed aggression, insurgencies, and terrorists attacks with a propensity of overrunning legitimate governments of affected African nations. No doubt, the call for a global efforts towards combating the menace of terrorism is a welcomed development, it is however, yet to be seen whether such global war on terrorism would yield the desired result any time soon. As most countries of the world grapples with their peculiar cases of terrorism, it is almost impossible to secure genuine cooperation amongst nations of the world, where national interests and foreign policy thrust are at variance. With reference to the specific case of Nigeria, the terrorists activities in the North-East of the country, perpetuated by the Boko Haram Islamic sect have threatened the existence of the country to its very foundation. Much has been written about the global war on terrorism (GWOT), viz-a-vis the protracted terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria. However, there appear to be a dearth of research materials on the specific government counter-terrorism strategies in Africa, Nigeria in particular. The effectiveness or otherwise of such counter-terrorism strategies has not been fairly treated in the available literature. Relying preponderantly on secondary sources of historical information therefore, the paper seeks to explore the counter terrorism strategies of the Nigerian government; which includes military intervention, global collaboration, identifying, and blocking sources of funding for Boko Haram, etc., were not as effective as expected, due to a number of factors. The paper concluded that factors, such as widespread poverty, lack of political will, religious fanaticism and corruption did not only inhibit the effectiveness of government counter-terrorism measures, but form the very bases that drive and sustain terrorism in Nigeria. Recommendations were proffered.

Keywords: Security, Global, Strategy, Military, Restructuring, Terrorism.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows:

Ehimate, A., & Enueme, P. O. (2023). Global war on terrorism in Africa: rethinking Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies in North-Eastern Nigeria. *International Journal of Economics, Environmental Development and Society*, 4(4), 458-467.

Copyright © IJEEDS 2023 [ISSN: 2992-5614].

INTRODUCTION

The entire world was thrown into a panic mood on the 11th September, 2011, following the simultaneous attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), and the Pentagon by Islamic extremist group, Al-Qaeda. Since then, the world has never known peace, as reported cases of similar terrorists attacks have been on the increase. Although, the September 11th, 2011 attack cannot be the first case of terrorist attack ever recorded in human history, due to the nature of its horrendous consequences, there exist the fear that most terrorist attacks are driven by religious extremism, which makes the phenomenon a hydra-headed monster. This paper is prompted by a number of factors; for whereas the call by the international community for a collaborative effort against terrorism, as championed by the super power nations of the world is obviously a welcomed development, there is however a yawning gap between mere verbal declaration and the will power in term of taking practical steps to stemming the tide of the menace. There appear to be a level of inconsistency between the numerous condemnation and avowed determination by various national governments of African nations, and genuine collaborative efforts by national governments at nipping the menace in the bud. Thus, the African continent has remained a vortex of terrorist activities since the beginning of the 21st century. In the light of the above, this paper takes a look at the concept of terrorism as it relates to the African region. The specific case of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies is examined.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Attempts at conceptualizing terrorism have generated heated arguments among scholars, due to the very thorny nature of the subject matter. It has been a case of different strokes for different folks, as scholars and analysts alike, are divided in their opinions depending on their respective ideological leanings. Hoffman (1998) opined that the word terrorism is politically and emotionally charged, and this greatly compounds the difficulty of giving the exact definition. In the midst of the divergent views, scholars have been able to define the concept of terrorism from different perspective. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act. The above definition invariably gives terrorism its undeniable political undertone. Whereas it is true that some terrorists activities have several other motives, a good number of terrorist acts bother on power, its acquisition, and the use of same to actualize targeted political gain or gains.

Viewed from the standpoints of principles governing common humanity, one cannot but see the illegal and illegitimate means of staging a violent protest as condemnable. In the light of the above, terrorism amounts to the use of methods that oppose human standards to press for a demand-causing and inflicting long-lasting, and in most cases, permanent injuries to the victims. Violence is the weapon and language of terrorism (Ashara, 2013).

Further attempts to define terrorism within the context of intra-state religious extremism, or outrageous politically motivated violence within national boundaries points to a rather parochial understanding of the concept, as terrorism has now become a transnational phenomenon. With the atrophy of distance, due to terrorists' reliance on the most advanced technology of modern civilization, national borders are no longer barriers to terrorism. This is due to radical advancement in information technology and scientific innovations.

Flowing from this understanding, other scholars posited that terrorism is a premeditated violence perpetrated against non-combatant agents, usually intended to influence audience

(Kegley & Blanton, 2012). This line of thought presupposes that terrorism cannot be seen only from the perspective of violent behaviour confined within national boundary. As a matter of fact, while it is true that most national governments are threatened by the existence of multi-faceted terrorist activities, a good number of such terrorist acts are transnational in nature and kind. The above brings to fore the international dimension to terrorism which has been explained to mean an act, orchestrated by transnational non-state organizations through global conspiratorial networks of terrorist cells located in many countries, involving unprecedented levels of communication and coordination (Sageman, 2004).

Obviously, the modern context of terrorism has revealed a more sophisticated, more deadly, and more systematic transnational violent approach to attacks on targeted groups, and governmental facilities and institutions. This new trend has not only broken states' monopoly of violence, but has at the same time posed serious threat to global peace and security. All the above dimensions of terrorism are reflected in the strands of African's terror ordeal, particularly from the beginning of the 21st century.

Africa's Terror Ordeals and Global War on Terrorism in Africa

Like many nations of the world, African nations, as members of the global community, have been grappling with the menace of terrorism. The continent of Africa has been bedeviled by outrageous escalations of violent conflicts and wars. The situation is made worst by the high rate of terrorists activities that have spread across the length and breadth of Africa. The monumental increase in terrorists activities in Africa, coupled with the worrisome escalation of violent conflicts and insecurity, all combine to present Africa in bad light within the international community.

The upsurge in terrorists activities in Africa is attributed to some external and internal factors. On the one hand is the aftermath of the cold war experience, which culminated in the U.S.'s surreptitious support for the Muslim militants in Soviet-Afghan war between 1979 and 1989, leading to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Thereafter, there was mass exodus of fully trained and heavily equipped militants, fleeing Afghanistan and seeking safe haven in Africa, where they formed new extremist groups and spear-headed several insurgencies against African Muslim states they deemed impious (Schmidt, 2013).

Secondly, as an aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on US, most terrorist groups affiliated to the Al-Qaeda, for fear of reprisal attack by U.S. forces, were forced to seek refuge in other parts of the world. A good number of them relocated to Africa to continue their terrorist activities, thereby making Africa a theatre of terrorist activities. This explains why armed aggression and terrorism in Africa is saturated with a variety of armed militant groups, many of which are affiliated to major international terrorist organisations like the Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The third factor falls into the internal category and it has to do with the deliberate attempt by the ruling elites in Africa to weaponise religion. As one of the agents of social change, religion in Africa has been weaponized to the extent that fanatical Muslims with religious extremism have always unleashed mayhem on civilian population that do not share their religious ideology. Such religious fanaticism is usually laced with political undertone. Thus, in pursuit of political power and recognition, religious extremists deploy terrorist approach against government agencies and institutions in order to secure political concessions. This can be situated within the theoretical framework called the strategic model of terrorism which posited

that aggrieved groups turn to terrorism because it helps to achieve their political platform (Abraham, 2008). Terrorism in Africa, like in many parts of the world is multi-faceted, as no one single factor can satisfactorily explain the phenomenal upsurge in terrorism in Africa. Similarly, such multi-dimensional escalation of terrorists activities depend on the prevailing socio-political and economic conditions, which vary from one African country to another.

Unfortunately, global efforts towards curbing the menace of terrorism have not yielded the desired result. For several decades now, the U.S. had achieved and maintained global military and economic dominance, and has seemingly deployed same in the global war against terrorism. The September 11th, 2011 experience made the U.S. to rejig her security architecture to cope with emerging strands in terrorist's activities. Thus, the U.S. has always been interested in tackling global terrorism from the frontline. Same cannot be said about African nations, as most African leaders watch helplessly in the face ravaging terrorist activities in their domain. The specific case of Nigeria's experience of terrorism in the North-eastern region is quite revealing.

Terrorist Activities in North-Eastern Nigeria

Terrorism in Africa is historically evolving. The Nigerian case is exceptionally unique, in the sense that it accommodates a number of factors. At the center of its causative factors is the ethno-religious dimension. Meanwhile, a panoptic examination of the terrorist's activities in the north-eastern Nigeria reveals a political trajectory. The political dimension is such that some top government officials of some northern states, and some officials of the federal government have been fingered for their complicity in deploying the terrorist groups to advance their political agenda. This explains why the Boko-Haram menace has remained intractable in the north-east of Nigeria. The historical background to Boko Haram terrorist activities in north-eastern Nigeria has been fairly treated in available literature. The ethno-religious dimension and complicity of top government functionaries have equally been canvassed by Ekhomu (2020), and it is worth quoting at length—it was the gubernatorial candidature of senator Ali Modu Sheriff that brought him into close contact with Mohammed Yusuf (founder of Boko Haram), and the Yusufiyya movement. Instead of implementing the strict sharia code which he had promised as a pre-condition for Yusuf's electoral support, senator Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed the national secretary of the Yusufiyya movement, Alhaji Buji Foi, as the commissioner of Religious Affairs.

The fulcrum of this study is basically to interrogate the counter-terrorism strategy of the federal government of Nigeria. As a matter of fact, the federal government had initiated a number of counter-terrorism strategies, with a view of stemming the tide of terrorist activities in north-eastern Nigeria, but to no avail. It has remained a source of worry that despite several efforts to nip terrorism in the bud, the menace has continued to be intractable as ever. This paper attempts to capture such anti-terrorism strategies in the following order.

First and foremost, within the context of global war on terrorism, Nigeria being an integral part of the international community, and having also subscribed to relevant sections of the United Nations Charter, it became a matter of necessity for Nigeria to seek global collaboration against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Global support against terrorists is currently being utilized by Nigeria in her fight to annihilate Boko Haram terrorists in North-eastern region of the country. In this regard, Nigeria has partnered world powers who are willing to assist with superior technical, technological and scientific aids needed in tackling modern acts of terrorism. The case of an abducted American, Philip Nathan Walton readily comes to mind

here. Philip Nathan Walton, who was abducted by suspected Boko Haram terrorists on the 1st of November, 2020, from his farm in Massalata, southern Niger, was taken across Niger-Nigerian porous border into Northern Nigeria. He was rescued in Nigeria by a U.S joint operations force in Zero casualty operation. Highlighting on Nigeria's global collaboration, Migdal (1988) opined that, there, is an international dimension toward curbing the trend of terrorism in Nigeria. The direction of the collaboration has taken the form of international support for Nigerian government to be able to put an end to Boko Haram activities in the country. The collaboration, as mention earlier, enhances manpower (military) development, efforts at attracting global funding for Nigerian military in acquiring capacity, supply of arms and ammunition, as well as global intelligence gathering and sharing same with Nigerian authority.

Unfortunately, such global collaboration has not yielded the expected result in curbing the menace of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. It is obvious that the complex nature of the internal security challenges has inhibited the effectiveness of such global collaboration. Nigeria's security architecture has been bedeviled by internal sabotage, betrayal, and treachery among the officers and men of the armed forces. In the face of such internal disconnect, global collaboration cannot thrive, let alone achieving any positive result. This is the bane to Nigeria's dilemma over Boko Haram terrorism in the country. Alluding to the above reality, Basil Okoh (2023) remarked; the war against ISWAP, Boko Haram and all other insurgent groups in north-eastern Nigeria has been betrayed beyond redemption and can no longer be won...This treachery and betrayal are by politicians, officers, and men who should have owned the war and fought with zeal to save their land and territory.

The highly celebrated case of the rescued of an American, Philip Nathan Walton, through international collaboration between U.S. Joint operations force and the Nigerian military is simply an exceptional case. It was made possible because an American citizen was involved and Nigeria stands the danger of strain diplomatic relations with America, should anything untoward happened to an American citizen on Nigerian soil. Otherwise, the infiltration of Boko Haram and other criminal elements into Nigerian armed forces, and other paramilitary institutions has made the fight against terrorism in Nigeria an exercise in futility.

Another counter-terrorism strategy adopted by Nigerian government in response to the upsurge in terrorists activities in northern-eastern Nigeria is identifying and blocking sources of funding for Boko Haram. It has been discovered that terrorist organization cannot sustain their nefarious activities for too long without local and, or external funding. Modern terrorism is an expensive venture because it requires personnel maintenance and management, acquisition of sophisticated weapons, and general running of the various terrorist camps. The lifeline of terrorist organization is its capacity to raise substantial revenue based to finance its numerous deadly operations and for the recruitment of new members. In the Nigeria context, it has been discovered that Boko Haram sources of funding are extortions, robberies and looting, cattle and livestock rustling, kidnapping for ransom, arms smuggling and bank robberies (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2021).

On the basis of the above discovery, the Nigerian government introduced strategic measures to identify and to block the sources of Boko Haram funding, so as to cripple the groups activities. One of such measures was to freeze the account of the suspected financiers. Security was beefed up around bank premises within Boko Haram operation areas to prevent incessant bank robberies. Again, government increased security strategy to frustrate ransom payment for kidnapped victims. It also shut down cattle marks in the zone to prevent cattle rustling (Jason, 2016).

Laudable as the above measure may seem, it still could not stem the tide of Boko Haram insurgency in the north-easter Nigeria. The alleged complicity of individuals within the corridors of power in the sponsorship and funding of Boko Harama insurgency in the northeast has made it impossible to check or block the sources of funding for the terrorist group. Similarly, the strategy of frustrating ransom payment to block revenue source of the terrorists has also proved ineffectual, as victims of kidnapping and their families, who are eager to save the lives of victims, are usually unwilling to accept government's warning against such payment of ransom. Considering the physical, psychological and emotional trauma victims and their families are subjected to, such ransom payments are usually concluded without the knowledge of government official or security agents. In the same vein, cattle rustling, and armed robbery both on the highways, homes, and banks have continued unabated. All of these violent crimes are veritable criminal sources of fund for the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria.

Concerted effort was geared towards the acquisition and development of sophisticated, adequate, and appropriate military hardware. This measure was taken against the backdrop of terrorists' deployment of highly sophisticated arms and ammunition in their attacks against targeted government institutions and communities. It was government's well considered opinion that if the battle against terrorist activities must be won, sophisticated military hardware's of higher capacity than the ones being used by terrorist should be procured and deployed effectively. Consequently the Nigerian government over the years has invested huge amount of money on equipping the military with sophisticated weapons to confront the Boko Haram terrorists group that has laid siege in the northeast. During President Goodluck Jonathan administration, it was alleged that the sum of 2.1 billion U.S. Dollars was spent on military weapons through the office of the National Security Adviser (The cable, 2014). Though this figure is shrouded in controversy, it is on record that huge amount of money was spent to buy military weapons to fight Boko Haram during the period.

In the same vein, President Muhammadu Buhari led administration was reputed to have spent over 1 billion U.S dollars to acquire military hardware from the U.S. and other countries to fight Boko Haram and other insurgent groups in the country (This day, 2023). The above records explain the level of Nigerian government's efforts towards equipping the military with capacity to decimate Boko Haram terrorism and other insurgent groups in the country.

However, such measures and efforts could not achieve the desired result due to insincerity, internal sabotage, ethno-religious bias, and high level corruption among government functionaries, and officers and men of the Nigerian military. This explain why the verifiable number of military hardwares, the available weapons at the disposal of Nigerian military viz-a-viz the competence, capacity and credibility of the Nigeria military at the various theatres of operation against Boko Haram terrorists and other insurgent groups, are not in any way commensurate with the humongous amount purportedly spent by the government on procurement of weapons. It is indeed sanding that the huge of amount money budgeted annually for procurement of weapons, does not translate into a well-equipped military, capable of decimating Boko Haram fighters and other insurgent groups. Rather, we hear reported cases where Nigerian military flee for safety at the emergence of Boko Haram fighters, because the former is ill-equipped. The case of Dansiku (then National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan), who was alleged to have embezzled millions of naira meant for the procurement of military hardwares, is still fresh in the mind of the people. It is therefore not surprising that the Boko Haram menace has continued unabated in the northeastern Nigeria.

Moreso, the federal government of Nigeria has severally relied on the provisions of the Nigeria constitution, which empowers the president, and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces to declared state of emergency in any part of the country where breach of public peace and violent conflict have been observed. On the basis of the above, the federal government of Nigeria in its effort to counter the terrorists activities of Boko Haram in the north east, declared a state of emergency in three (3) most affected northern states of Adamawa, Yobe, and Bornu. The target was to restrict movement of persons within a certain period of time, to be able to monitor the activities of the terrorists. The essence was to enhance military (security) intelligence gathering and sharing within the security apparatus; to urgently nip in the board, or to foil terrorist attacks. According to CNN world news (2013), the Jonathan administration declared a state of emergency as a response to the increasing activities of Boko Haram in the three northern states.

Yet, Boko Haram activities continued on the increase. The emergency rule as declared by federal government could not deter the terrorists in their operations. Instead, military personnels on routine patrol of the affected areas have reportedly ran into ambush by Boko Haram terrorists due to internal sabotage. Such internal sabotage within the military and para-military institutions has also made intelligence gathering and sharing very difficult. Therefore, aside some exceptionally cases where the Nigerian military put up bold and aggressive assault on the hide out of Boko Haram fighters, those criminal elements have successfully executed their attacks with reckless abandon. In extreme cases, the Boko Haram terrorists had hoisted their flags and established their administrative structure over such conquered territories. According to Ekhomu (2023), Ibn Tiammiya Masjid (Mosque) was the headquarters of the religious sect. Sheik Mohammed Yusuf and his hardline second-in-command, Abdubakar shekau, ran the organization from their mosque located at Anwar Doki in Maiduguri. The organization had three important organs including a cabinet which comprised the *langinas* (departments), the *Shura* (or consultative council) and the *Hisbah* (or Brigade of Guards and Militia). The above organogram was usually deployed to any of the territories in the norther-east that have been conquered by Boko Haram terrorists.

To ensure an all-embracing approach to the fight against the Boko Haram menace, the federal government of Nigeria encourages government-citizens relations on intelligence gathering. Nigerian government encourages both the public and the media to provide useful informational and security intelligence regarding the movements and operational plan of terrorist groups within their negighbourhood. The information extracted from the general public, particularly local vigilante groups, and the media has helped the government to arrest terrorists and foiled plan attack.

Joint border patrol and intelligence gathering among states sharing border with Nigeria in the Sahel region is another strategy adopted by Nigerian government in its fight against Boko Haram terrorism. Nigerian government got the support of international bodies, particularly the African Union (AU), to collaborate with her neighbours (chad, Niger, and Cameroon) to share security intelligence and to conduct joint border patrol in an effort to curb the activities of Boko Haram within the Shael region. This collaboration open a vista of opportunities for political authorities in the aforementioned countries to lawfully deploy troops on Nigerian soil, and vice versa, in order to synergise against terrorist organizations operating in the Sahel region. This approach has so far proved to be effective as fleeing Boko Haram terrorists have reportedly been killed or captured by the troops of the aforementioned countries in the Sahel region. However,

the porosity of the borders between Nigeria and such countries in the Sahel has been a major obstacle to the full realization of the gains of such collaboration.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government has adopted military approach to curb the activities of Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region. It implies the use of military force against terrorism. Adewunmi (2016) observed that Nigeria has been using what can be described as kinetic strategy in its conflicts with Boko Haram group. The kinetic strategy started with the brutal military force against insurgent groups in 2015 when the government of Nigeria deployed over 800 troops in the north-eastern Nigeria with consequential effects on civil right of the ordinary people. Amnesty international (2015) recorded that in a single operation, Nigerian military killed over 2000 civilians, suspected to be members of Boko Haram in the aftermath of a single attack in Baga town in 2012. The federal government of Nigeria deployed specially trained anti-terrorist combat squad to the terrorist infested zone in the northeastern Nigeria. The measures was taken in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram. It is noteworthy that till date, the Nigeria government is still holding on to kinetic approach in its war against Boko Haram and other insurgent groups in the country.

The military approach as described above as counter-terrorism strategy of Nigerian government that has elicited a wide range of reactions from a cross session of local and foreign analysts alike. While some applaud the measure, others picks holes on the devastating effect such military approach has on the civilian pollution. Apologists of the military approach to the fight against Boko Haram terrorist hinge their argument on the fact that it is suicidal to negotiate with terrorists. In their view therefore, maximum force is required to subdue the criminal elements, no matter whose ox is gored. However, modern wars are regulated by rules that guarantee the safety of non-combatants, especially women and children. In that light, any military approach that does not recognize the need to protect civilian population is recorded as a war crime.

On the strength of observed violation of the rights of non-combatants in the ensuing war against Boko Haram terrorists in northeastern Nigeria, military assaults on the terrorists usually leave scores of deaths and injuries on the civilian popular. A case in point was the Baga attack of 2012, where local politicians alleged that the Nigerian military committed mass Massacre of civilians and razed 2,600 houses (Ekhomu, 2020). However, an independent investigation into the alleged Baga Massacre reveals that the so called Baga massacre is “an indicator of the dilemma the Nigerian military faced under President Jonathan. There was a tendency to manufacture untruths and peddle them as facts”, (Ekhomu 2020). By and large, the military approach, just like other counter-terrorism-approaches so far adopted by the federal government of Nigeria is yet to nip the issue of Boko Haram terrorism in the bud. Each of the approaches, as laudable as it seems, possesses inherent challenges that inhabit the full realization of their benefits. Thus, the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria has remained a nightmare to Nigeria government and citizens alike.

Rethinking Nigeria’s strategies Against Boko Haram Terrorism in the North East

In the midst of the failed attempts at curbing the scourge of terrorism in Nigeria, scholars and analysts have come up with different opinions on how the menace can be best tackled. Judging by the very nature of the conflict, and the insecurity associated with it, one can rightly concludes that it falls into the category of intra-state conflict. In the light of that, tackling the menace does not necessarily require only military or kinetic approach.

It is therefore, a well-considered opinion of this research that while applying minimal military approach, genuine efforts should be geared toward addressing those internal socio-political and economic problems that has kept the country backward for decades. This suggestion becomes necessary because such internal problems have constituted the real obstacles that have inhibited the success of various measures of government in tackling the menace of terrorism. It is obvious that the bane of Nigeria's existence today is a combination of several internal factors; ranging from corruption, tribalism, religious intolerance, sabotage, and fraudulent activities of the leadership class. Until these ills are tackled from the root, any effort at tackling the Boko Haram terrorism will be an exercise in futility.

Again, it is important to note that the observed challenges to Nigeria's existence, as highlighted above have impacted negatively on the nation's security architecture. The observed cases of sabotage and divided loyalty within the military and paramilitary institutions are direct effects tribalism, religious intolerance, ethnicity, and of leadership failure at all levels. For a more effective security architecture therefore, this researcher advocates for a total rejig, overhauling and restructuring of the entire security outfits. A national military outfit, as presently constituted should be retained, but other paramilitary institutions like the police force should be restructured to reflect state policing, local government policing and community policing. Such state police structure would complement the efforts of the federal police and the military in such a way that there would be synergy in combating all forms of crimes including terrorism. The efforts of the local vigilante as a component of state policing cannot be overemphasized. It is easier for such local vigilante to identify both local and foreign criminal elements. A well restructured security architecture would ensure that local vigilante would liaise with the state police command, which will in turn synergize with the federal police and the military in information sharing, crime detection, and prevention. Under such arrangement, terrorist groups would find it difficult to perpetuate their terrorist act without being detected by any of the levels of security apparatus.

CONCLUSION

This study has been able to take a cursory look at the concept of global war on terrorism in Africa, using the Boko Haram terrorism in the north-eastern Nigeria as a case study. In specific terms, the study undertakes a voyage into the foray of counter-terrorism strategies of the Nigerian government. Such strategies which include global collaboration, identifying and blocking sources of funding for terrorists, military approach, joint border patrol, etc., were analysed. A critical examination of the various counter-terrorism measures taken by Nigeria government revealed that such strategies have not been able to achieve the desired objectives due to certain inhibiting factors. The study concludes that in the face of the failures of aforementioned counter-terrorist strategies of the federal government, there is need for practical steps towards restructuring of the nation's security architecture.

REFERENCES

- Abraham, M. (2008). What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy. *International Security*, 34(4), 78-105.
- Adewunmi J. F. (2016). Countering the Boko Harama Group in Nigeria: "The Relevance of Hybrid Doctrine". *Small Wars Journal*. Papers.ssm.com

- Amnesty International (2015). Stars on their Shoulder, Blood on their Hands: War Grime Committed by Nigeria Military. 2 June, 2015
- Ashara D. U. (2013). *The Trauma of Nigeria's Terror Ordeals: Trends Effects and Panacea*. Landers Printing Press.
- CNN News (May 14, 2013). Nigeria Declares Emergency in three (3) states during rebellion.
- Ekhomu O. (2020). *Boko Haram: Security Considerations and the Rise of an Insurgency*. CRC Press.
- European Union Agency for Asylum (AUAA) (2021). Boko Haram, including JAS, ISWAP and Ansaru. www.euaa.europa.eu.
- Hoffman Eruce (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press.
- Jason L. R. (2016). The Funding of Boko Haram and Nigeria's Action to stop it. Nava Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
- Kegley, C. W., & Blanton, S. L. (2012). *World politics: trends and transformations, 2011-2012* update edition. Cengage Learning.
- Migdal (1988). *Strong societies and weak states: State society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton University Press.
- Okoh Basi (2023). *Blood in the oil*. Brave Technologies.
- Sageman, Marc (2004) *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Schmidt, E. (2013). *Foreign intervention in Africa: from the cold war to the war on terror*. Cambridge University Press.
- The Cable News (2014) Exclusive: Dasuki got Jonathan's Approval to collect 2.1 Billion U.S Dollars from NMPC in 9 months.
- This day (18 January, 2023) Insecurity: Nigeria Has spent Over 1 billion dollars on Purchase of Weapon in Eight years, Buhari Reveals [www. This day live.com](http://www.thisdaylive.com) (2023/01/18)